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Patent Liability Rules as Search Rules
Jonathan S. Masurt
Patent law's infringement doctrines, commonly understood to be simply rules of
liability, are in fact search rules as well. Patent liability rules determine not only who
will be responsible for what conduct, but also when patent holders and potential in-
fringers will benefit from locating (or remaining ignorant of) one another. They thus
affect the conditions under which parties will have incentives to engage in search. The
dynamics of patent search are actually quite complicated. Under normal circumstances,
patent law's liability rules generate approximately optimal investments in search as both
patent holders and possible infringers have incentives to locate one another. But when a
direct infringer is insolvent or unreachable, the fact that contributory infringers can be
held liable only when they have knowledge of the patent shifts search responsibilities
toward patent holders. Search incentives are also affected by patent law's rules regard-
ing past conduct and by the possibility of holdup problems based on alleged infringers'
product-specific investments. This Article demonstrates that patent law's liability rules
may be generating inefficient levels of search and corresponding social welfare losses
and proposes a simple doctrinal corrective.
INTRODUCTION
The patent law doctrines of direct and contributory infringement
are, first and foremost, doctrines of liability. The infringement doc-
trines allocate liability for the unlicensed use of a patented invention
among the patent holder, the firm that produces the infringing prod-
uct, and any other firms that supply significant components of that
product.' This point is so obvious that it is rarely remarked upon. Yet
perhaps because it is so obvious, it has served to obscure these rules'
other significant function: they allocate search responsibilities (and
search costs) among the same parties. The rules governing patent lia-
bility are also rules that govern patent search.
The explanation lies with the incentives that these rules create for
parties to learn of patents (and infringing goods) earlier or later in
time. Patent holders nearly always have incentives to locate infringers;
once they know of the existence of infringing behavior, they can elect
where and when to open licensing negotiations or file suit. When a pro-
ducer of goods is directly liable for infringement, it too has incentives to
t Assistant Professor, The University of Chicago Law School.
I thank Richard Epstein, Mark Lemley, Saul Levmore, Doug Lichtman, and participants at
the Licensing of Intellectual Property Symposium at The University of Chicago Law School for
helpful comments. I also thank Joe Bingham for excellent research assistance.
1 See 35 USC § 271(a), (c).
187
The University of Chicago Law Review
locate (and license) patents ex ante. The producer is liable for infring-
ing behavior that occurs even before the date a patent holder files
suit, and so it would only be setting a trap for itself were it to begin
producing without a license in place.
The equation changes, however, when the direct infringer of a
patent is insolvent or otherwise unavailable for suit. A patent holder
may still be able to sue suppliers of components for the final product
or other related parties under the doctrine of contributory infringe-
ment. But these contributory infringers are not immediately liable.
Rather, liability attaches only when the patent holder knows of both
the existence of the patent and the producer's failure to obtain a li-
cense. It cannot be held liable for conduct that occurs before it learns
of the patent.
This incentive to remain ignorant shifts the entire search burden to
the patent holder, which cannot rely on possible (contributory) infring-
ers to seek it out. And because the patent holder also cannot determine
in advance when direct infringers will be insolvent or unavailable, it will
end up conducting broader searches in the hope of locating the proper
parties. Both patent holders and possible infringers will utilize mixed
strategies, investing resources in search in some cases but not others.
And in many cases infringers will engage in suboptimal levels of search,
forcing patent holders to search at inefficient levels. The result is social
waste, generated by the manner in which the doctrine of contributory
infringement shields unknowing parties from liability.
Interestingly, this dynamic is present in few other areas of law.
Patent law is distinctive in that the "harm"-patent infringement-
frequently occurs without any discernable impact upon the aggrieved
party, and in places that are physically distant from the patent holder.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs and defendants in patent cases are often
strangers, and the parties may not even be aware of one another's
existence. By contrast, parties to a contract dispute are by definition
familiar with one another. Similarly, the typical tort case does not in-
volve any particular mystery regarding the identities of the plaintiff
and defendant. The two have generally interacted in some immediate
fashion, or the defendant is one of a finite number of potential actors.
Contract and tort defendants also cannot shield themselves from lia-
bility through ignorance. But in intellectual property cases, the puta-
tive plaintiff and defendant may have no knowledge of either the
harm or each other. For some defendants, this ignorance even serves
as a complete defense. The need to expend resources on search thus
rises to the fore.
This Article proceeds in two Parts. Part I describes the doctrine
of contributory infringement as a legal outlier and analyzes the com-
plex incentives for search that it creates. Part II proceeds normatively:
[78:187188
Patent Liability Rules as Search Rules
it demonstrates that the search behaviors that arise as a result of pat-
ent law's liability rules will in some cases diminish social welfare, and
it suggests a simple doctrinal solution.
I. CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT
The doctrine of contributory infringement functions best when it
is least necessary. When a patent owner can sue the direct infringer,
the doctrine will allow parties within a supply chain to allocate liabil-
ity among themselves so as to minimize search and licensing costs.
When the direct infringer is unavailable for suit, however, the doc-
trine channels search costs toward the patent holder, who likely can
handle them least efficiently. The result is social waste, driven by the
ability of contracting parties to escape liability and allocate search
costs to the owner of the patent.
A. Contributory Infringement Doctrine in Comparative Context
Whether measured against other patent doctrines, or even
against other legal doctrines more generally, patent law's doctrine of
contributory infringement is an outlier. The reason is the mens rea
requirement it imposes. Before a party can be held liable as a contrib-
utory infringer of a patent, that party must have knowledge of two
distinct facts: (1) the existence of the patent, and (2) whether the di-
rect infringer-with whom the contributory infringer is likely in con-
tractual privity-has obtained a license on the patent.2 In other words,
the putative contributory infringer must be aware of the full legal sta-
tus of the patent and the relationship between the direct infringer and
the patent holder.
This is an extraordinary requirement, one that is present few other
places in the law. By and large, patent law is based upon strict liability.
There is no mens rea requirement attached to literal infringement or
2 See 35 USC § 271(c); Aro Manufacturing Co v Convertible Top Replacement Co, 377 US
476, 488 (1964) ("[Section] 271(c) does require a showing that the alleged contributory infringer
knew that the combination for which his component was especially designed was both patented
and infringing."). This Article focuses on contributory infringement, rather than induced in-
fringement, because the latter imposes an even greater mens rea requirement. See 35 USC
§ 271(b); Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 UC Davis L Rev 225, 237-38 (2005)
("In part to avoid these problems, courts interpreting the 1952 Patent Act have uniformly inter-
preted section 271(b) to require not just knowledge, and certainly not mere willful blindness, but
also a 'specific intent and action to induce infringement."') (citation omitted). The inducement
doctrine is also in a state of some flux. At the time of this writing, the Supreme Court has grant-
ed certiorari in a case that will likely clarify exactly what degree of intent is necessary for liabil-
ity. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc v SEB S.A., 131 S Ct 458 (2010).
2011] 189
The University of Chicago Law Review
infringement by equivalents.! Patentability doctrines such as novelty
and the statutory bars similarly involve no particular state of mind.4
Copyright's doctrine of contributory infringement is highly unsettled,
but at least in some formulations constructive knowledge-a party
"should have known" that infringement was occurring-will suffice.
Even within the criminal law it is rare for liability to be imposed
only in the presence of knowing -as opposed to negligent or reckless -
conduct.' In addition, the demand that the alleged infringer know of the
existence of a patent and the nonexistence of a license verges on requir-
ing knowledge of the legal status of the act, a condition that has been
roundly rejected in criminal (not to mention civil) law.'
The knowledge requirement in patent's doctrine of contributory in-
fringement is usually defended on the ground that it would be unfair to
hold the supplier of a part liable if that part were to eventually find its
way into a larger, infringing product.! Without actions by others, the
contributory infringer has done nothing wrong.' Thus, it seems appro-
priate to hold the contributory infringer liable only when it was some-
how responsible for -or at least aware of-the actions of these others.
On its own terms, this seems a reasonable defense of contributory in-
fringement's knowledge requirement, and it most likely explains its
existence. But contributory infringement is not merely a rule that as-
signs liability when infringement has occurred. It is also a rule that as-
signs search obligations among parties, requiring some to actively
seek out their counterparts while permitting others to remain inactive.
Accordingly, the contributory infringement rules have significant eco-
nomic impact even when no suit is ever brought. They play a large
3 A mens rea requirement is present only within the related doctrine of induced infringe-
ment, 35 USC § 271(b), and the doctrine of willful infringement, which awards treble damages
against defendants who have engaged in particularly egregious conduct by continuing to infringe
after they learn of the existence of the patent. 35 USC § 284.
4 See 35 USC §§ 101-02.
5 See, for example, In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F3d 643, 650 (7th Cir 2003)
(holding that the owner of file-sharing software cannot escape liability for the copyright in-
fringement of its users simply by encrypting the transferred data and thus avoiding direct
knowledge of any infringements).
6 See, for example, MPC § 2.02(3) (ALI 1985) (stating that "recklessness" will suffice for
culpability under most criminal statutes).
7 See, for example, MPC § 2.02(9) (stating that knowledge of whether conduct constitutes
an offense is itself never an element of a criminal offense).
8 See, for example, Matthew T. Nesbitt, Comment, From Oil Lamps to Cell Phones: What
the Trilateral Offices Can Teach Us about Detangling the Metaphysics of Contributory Infringe-
ment, 21 Emory Intl L Rev 669, 686 (2007) (explaining that the knowledge requirement "was no
doubt intended to prevent the almost unlimited liability that would result if a manufacturer
produced a component covered by any claim of an enforceable patent").
9 Aro Manufacturing, 377 US at 482-83 ("[I]f there is no direct infringement of a patent
there can be no contributory infringement.").
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role in selecting which parties will bear the transaction costs involved
in locating and licensing intellectual property. And they impact the
contractual relationships between patent holders, producers, and parts
suppliers.
B. Liability-Driven Search
Consider a simple model involving four actors: a patent holder, a
producer (P), a first supplier (Si), and a second supplier (S2). The
patent holder owns a valuable patent but does not practice the inven-
tion; the producer either manufactures a good or engages in a process
that might infringe the patent;'o the first supplier manufactures an im-
portant component of the producer's good and sells it to the producer;
and the second supplier manufactures an important component of the
first supplier's good and sells it to the first supplier. Assume that both
the existence of the patent and the existence of the potentially infring-
ing good are costly to discover (as is typically the case).
As an initial matter, consider a situation in which the producer is
solvent and available for suit. Under these circumstances, the doctrine of
contributory negligence is largely irrelevant: the patent holder will al-
ways have the opportunity to sue the direct infringer (the producer).
The producer will thus have an incentive to search for all patents that its
product might infringe. Moreover, the producer will have an incentive to
conduct this search as early in the process of developing and marketing
a product as possible. If the producer begins to market the product and
is located by the patent holder only later, it will be liable for all infring-
ing conduct that occurred within six years of the date on which the pat-
ent holder files suit." And if the producer knowingly infringes the patent
without attempting to negotiate a license, it may be liable in addition for
treble damages under the doctrine of willful infringement."
If the producer does not search for potential patents early in the
process, it runs the risk of having its infringing behavior discovered
only after it has made capital investments in technology or materials
specific to the patented product. The producer would run the risk of
being subjected to the classic holdup problem: if a patent holder can
obtain an injunction against an infringing producer, then it can drive a
10 The term "producer" is meant very generally. The producer could be any entity from a
private user who violates a method patent in the privacy of her own home to a major manufac-
turing company. The salient differences between these possible parties will become clear in the
examples that follow.
11 See 35 USC § 286.
12 35 USC § 284 ("[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the amount
found or assessed."); In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F3d 1360, 1371 (Fed Cir 2007) (setting
forth the modem standard for determining when infringement has been willful).
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very hard bargain against the producer by threatening to shut down
production and render worthless the producer's product-specific in-
vestments." The producer thus has an incentive to locate the patent
holder before it makes irrevocable product-specific investments that
the patent holder might later be able to exploit.
Despite the producer's obvious incentives to search for patent
holders, patent holders must simultaneously search for producers. If
they did not, producers would have no reason ever to search for exist-
ing patents, as they would have no fear of being caught and sued. Ac-
cordingly, patent holders will utilize a type of mixed strategy, invest-
ing some resources in searching but limiting their search to allow pro-
ducers to bear most of the expense."
The producer's and patent holder's searches will thus proceed
simultaneously. Importantly, however, there should be few wasted
resources from these coincident searches. The two searches are inde-
pendent of one another and do not cover the same territory: the pro-
ducer is searching for patents, while the patent holder is searching for
products.15 If either party locates the other, it will establish contact and
attempt to negotiate a license, at which point both searches end.
Now, it is possible that one of the two parties-either the patent
holder or the producer -is more efficient at engaging in search. If this is
the case, then the system will generate some amount of inefficiency
because the less efficient searcher will nonetheless be involved in the
search to at least some small degree. The patent holder and producer
cannot contract with one another for the search to be performed by the
most efficient party because, by hypothesis, they have not located one
another. The producer and the two suppliers can, however, allocate the
costs of searching for a patent by contract. For instance, suppose that P
is assembling circuit boards using chips built by S1, which in turn incor-
porate specially developed transistors produced by S2. Despite the fact
that P is the end manufacturer, S2 may have greater knowledge and
13 See Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, The Law of Duress and the Economics of
Credible Threats, 33 J Legal Stud 391, 412 (2004); Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial
Structure 29-33 (Oxford 1995).
14 For an analysis of mixed strategies in law, see Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner,
and Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and the Law 313 (Harvard 1994) (describing a mixed strat-
egy equilibrium as one in which "one or more of the players adopts a strategy that randomizes
among a number of pure strategies").
15 This is in contrast to any number of other economic races, in which two parties compete
along the same dimension to be the first to complete some activity. In many types of races, includ-
ing patent races, the losing party's effort is entirely social waste. See, for example, John M. Golden,
Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 Tex L Rev 505, 530-31 (2010); Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled
Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 Harv L Rev 397, 440 (2009)
("Thus, the patent race literature proves that firms will make socially excessive (and often duplica-
tive) investments if they capture all the total surplus created by their innovations.").
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expertise regarding the universe of patents in the industry. This could
be the case if the vast majority of relevant patents covered transistors,
rather than fully assembled circuit boards. Accordingly, S2 might in-
demnify Si and P against the threat of patent infringement, effectively
assuming the costs of searching and licensing any existing patents. The
possibility of this type of efficient contracting is driven by P's potential
liability, which it must address in some fashion.
C. Search without Direct Infringement
Now, consider a situation in which the producer is judgment
proof or otherwise unavailable for suit." Under these circumstances,
the producer has no incentive to acquire information regarding the
existence of the patent. For the producer, there is no downside to be-
ing sued for infringement, and thus no reason to expend resources
searching for potential patents and negotiating (and paying for) li-
censes. Even if the producer knows of the existence of the patent, it
may well be in its best interest not to contact the patent holder and
attempt to negotiate a license. But contributory infringers (Si or S2)
might nonetheless be solvent and potential targets for litigation."
1. Producers and suppliers without product-specific investments.
How will the parties behave? Consider first the case in which the
production of the good-here, a circuit board and its accompanying
components-does not involve any specific investments by the pro-
ducer and suppliers. For instance, S2 may not need to develop or in-
stall any specialized equipment in order to manufacture the transistors
that will go into this circuit board; it may need only to calibrate its
machinery slightly differently (at low cost).
Under these circumstances, the suppliers will understand that
they can be shielded from liability by simply remaining unaware of the
16 There are a number of reasons why this might be the case. For instance, the producer
might simply be insolvent or insufficiently capitalized to pay a judgment of infringement. The
producer might be located in a jurisdiction that US law does not reach and thus may not be
available for suit. Or, most likely, the "producer" may be an individual who violates a patent in
the privacy of his own home and is not practically amenable to suit for infringement. See, for
example, Lucent Technologies, Inc v Gateway, Inc, 580 F3d 1301, 1320-22 (Fed Cir 2009) (in-
volving a suit against Microsoft for contributory infringement of a patent for using a calendar
function, in which the direct infringers were individual users who installed Microsoft programs
and ran the calendar function).
17 It is not uncommon for a large company to supply a component of a larger invention to
a smaller producer, creating situations in which the supplier continues as a going concern even
after the producer has become insolvent.
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patent," and they will avoid expending any resources searching." This
extends to the point of deliberate attempts to remain ignorant: the
suppliers will actively endeavor to avoid learning of the patent from
the producer, even if the producer already has knowledge of its exist-
ence.' The suppliers even have incentives to contract with the producer
that this information not be shared, even if it were costless for the pro-
ducer to share the information. For that matter, the producer may
know of the patent ahead of time and thus might be liable as a willful
infringer, but it would have no reason to fear liability itself and no rea-
son to share the information with the supplier. The producer might
even pirate technical information from a patent, share that information
with a supplier without divulging its source, and then allow the supplier
to build parts to the patent's specification without ever attempting to
license the patent. In effect, the knowledge requirement acts as a shield
that allows the producer and suppliers to draft a contract that maxi-
mizes their gains at the expense of the third-party patent holder.
From the perspective of the patent holder, the problems are two-
fold. First, the patent holder will understand the suppliers' incentives
to remain ignorant of the patent and will be forced to expend re-
sources searching for infringing products. Here, the patent holder
must conduct the entire search; there is no corresponding party who
will be simultaneously searching for patents. And it is quite likely that
the patent holder is not the lowest-cost searcher. Patents are not nec-
essarily easy or cheap to find. A patent may not contain the key words
that a potential infringer would expect to find in a search, or it may
concern an invention that appears largely unrelated to the technology
at issue.21 It is for this reason that commercial firms are often caught
18 See Aro Manufacturing, 377 US at 488.
19 Of course, a supplier might directly infringe another patent, and thus would be forced to
search for that patent and arrange licensing deals. But that search and the search for patents that
might be infringed by the finished product will frequently diverge. For instance, in the example
described above, S2 would be concerned only with patent processes for manufacturing semicon-
ductors, rather than product patents on circuit boards and related semiconductor devices.
20 See, for example, Nesbitt, Comment, 21 Emory Intl L Rev at 708 (cited in note 8)
("[T]he U.S. approach to the knowledge requirement can have the unintended effect of encour-
aging manufacturers to remain ignorant about issued patents."); Alfred P. Ewert and Irah H.
Donner, Will the New Information Superhighway Create "Super" Problems for Software Engi-
neers? Contributory Infringement of Patented or Copyrighted Software-Related Applications, 4
Albany L J Sci & Tech 155, 202 (1994) ("[A]t least in this instance, ignorance is 'bliss."').
21 See, for example, In re Schreiber, 128 F3d 1473, 1474 (Fed Cir 1997) (holding that a
patent on a conical top used to dispense oil for industrial use read on the invention of a cone-
shaped top for slowly dispensing popcorn).
[78:187194
20111 Patent Liability Rules as Search Rules 195
unawares by suits for infringement based on patents that they would
undoubtedly have preferred to have discovered and licensed."
Yet patents are at least electronically indexed and searchable.'
Physical products, on the other hand, are rarely available in any type
of searchable index.24 Moreover, the features of a product that infringe
a patent are often not apparent from the front of the product's pack-
aging-this can be private information that is costly to discover from
the product itself.' In many cases, the patent holder will be forced to
examine and analyze the product in some detail to ascertain whether
it infringes the patent.2 Thus, even though it is undoubtedly difficult
for a producer to locate relevant patents, as a comparative matter, it is
likely easier for a producer to find relevant patents than for a patent
holder to locate potentially infringing products. It is for this reason
that patents are more commonly analyzed and cited by Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) examiners than any other type of prior art-
the search costs are comparatively lower.27
Consequently, forcing the patent holder to conduct the entire
search will result in inefficient expenditures of resources that could be
more efficiently deployed by a firm within the chain of production. By
effectively reallocating search costs from producers to patent holders,
22 See, for example NTP, Inc v Research In Motion, Ltd, 418 F3d 1282, 1287 (Fed Cir 2005)
(involving a suit against the manufacturer of the BlackBerry concerning a patent that it did not
know existed).
23 See United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), Search for Patents, online at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/search (visited Oct 25, 2010) (providing a searchable data-
base of patents, with images for patents filed after 1790 and full-text searching for patents filed
after 1976).
24 See Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark A. Lemley, and Bhaven N. Sampat, Do Applicant
Patent Citations Matter? Implications for the Presumption of Validity *12 (unpublished manu-
script, Aug 2010), online at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1656568 (visited Oct 25, 2010).
25 See, for example, Dunlop Holdings, Ltd v Ram Golf Corp, 524 F2d 33, 34, 35 n 7 (7th
Cir 1975) (involving a patent on a coating for golf balls, the formula for which could only be
determined-with difficulty-by chemically analyzing the coating).
26 To be certain, the producer may have to hire an attorney to examine a patent before
understanding whether its product infringes. This can be quite costly. But a patent holder must
examine a potentially infringing product and hire an attorney to assess its own patent before it
can initiate an infringement suit. The fact that the patent holder owns the patent does not mean
that it will instantly understand the metes and bounds of that property right and its applicability
to a new technology.
27 See Susan Walmsley Graf, Comment, Improving Patent Quality through Identification of
Relevant Prior Art: Approaches to Increase Information Flow to the Patent Office, 11 Lewis &
Clark L Rev 495, 503 (2007) ("[E]xaminer-cited prior art references are heavily weighted toward
U.S. and foreign patents, as opposed to non-patent literature."). See also Robert P. Merges, As
Many as Six Impossible Patents before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and
Patent System Reform, 14 Berkeley Tech L J 577, 589 (1999) (observing that US patents make up
60 percent of all references cited in software patents). Patents are available at lower cost than
nearly any other type of technical information, particularly actual physical products.
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the knowledge requirement built into the doctrine of contributory
infringement will lead to wasteful behavior.
The prospect of an insolvent producer and shielded suppliers will
also exert feedback effects even in cases in which the producer is not
insolvent. If patent holders knew that all potential infringers were
solvent, they would understand that these infringers had incentives to
locate and license their patents. They could then reduce their own
search activities accordingly. This would be efficient, if indeed it is the
case that producers can search for patents at lower cost than patent
holders can search for products. But when some producers are insol-
vent, the overall rate at which producers search for patents will de-
cline. The less producers spend searching for patents, the more patent
holders must adjust their mixed strategy to expend greater resources
on searching, because the less they will be able to rely on producers'
incentives to locate patents in the first instance.' And the more that
patent holders are forced to conduct the search, the greater the ineffi-
ciency and waste.
This is not the only potential problem. Even if the patent holder
succeeds in discovering the existence of the product, as well as the
producer's relationship with one or both suppliers, the patent holder
cannot collect damages on sales that have already occurred. In the
event that the patent holder manages to learn of the product's exist-
ence, it will immediately notify the producer and suppliers of its pat-
ent and the likelihood of infringement. This notification imbues the
suppliers with the necessary knowledge to satisfy the requirements of
contributory infringement.' But it is prospective only: the suppliers'
conduct before they received notice is unreachable.' The patent hold-
er will never recoup the lost royalties or profits from those pre-notice
activities. By contracting to preserve the suppliers' ignorance regard-
ing potential contributory infringement, the producer and suppliers
maximize their joint surplus at the patent holder's expense."
28 See Baird, Gertner, and Picker, Game Theory at 31-38 (cited in note 14).
29 See, for example Aro Manufacturing, 377 US at 488-89; Trell v Marlee Electronics Corp,
912 F2d 1443, 1448 (Fed Cir 1990); Armstrong v Motorola, Inc, 374 F2d 764,773 (7th Cir 1967).
30 Trell, 912 F2d at 1447 ("[T]he knowledge requirement of section 271(c) limit[s] an al-
leged contributory infringer's liability to sales made after it receive[s] a letter from the patent-
holder informing it of the existence of the patent."). See also Aro Manufacturing, 377 US at 491
("Aro cannot be held liable in the absence of a showing that at the time it had already acquired
the requisite knowledge that the Ford car tops were patented and infringing.").
31 In Part II, I consider whether this transfer of wealth from patent holders to producers
and suppliers has negative dynamic effects on welfare as well. For the moment, it suffices to note
that producers and other commercial firms will be able to use ignorance as a substitute for li-
censing relevant patents, to the detriment of patent holders.
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2. Producers and suppliers who have made specific investments.
Now consider the possibility that the producers or suppliers in-
volved in the production of a product might have made investments
specific to that product in the course of bringing it to market. For in-
stance, S1 may have had to purchase new chip fabrication machines to
construct integrated circuits to the specifications laid out by P. These
new machines might be expensive, and they might be useful only in
the production of chips built to the specifications that P has out-
lined -specifications that may infringe an existing patent. Product-
specific investments present economic risk to suppliers who would
otherwise be shielded from contributory liability by their lack of
knowledge. Recall that if a patent holder can locate a supplier that has
made significant product-specific investments, it can drive a hard bar-
gain in licensing negotiations by threatening to block the supplier's
activities and destroy the value of those investments.32
If it is P that must make the product-specific investments, then
there will likely be little effect. P is already insolvent or unreachable,
and the threat of having its product-specific investments rendered
worthless is likely not significant. If instead it is Si or S2 that must
make the product-specific investments, then the situation is different.
Even if S1 cannot be sued for infringement without first being notified
by the patent holder of the existence of a patent, and even if S1 can-
not be sued for conduct that predates this notification, Si may very
well have something to lose in the event that a patent exists: the value
of these product-specific investments. If the patent holder can locate S1,
then it can extract significant concessions -perhaps including the
equivalent of damages for past conduct -in exchange for allowing Si to
continue to produce the good, preserving the value of its investments.
The potential bargaining between the patent holder and S1 over
a license on the patent is not straightforward, but a simple numerical
example should suffice to illustrate the holdup problem that S1 would
face in the event that it made product-specific investments. Suppose
that there are two potential components that S1 could devote its re-
sources to producing: A and B. If S1 produces A, it can earn yearly
profits of $1,000 for each of the next five years; if Si produces B, it
can earn yearly profits of $900 for each of the next five years. In either
case, S1 will be forced to make an upfront investment of $2,000 to
produce the good.33 Suppose S1 invests $2,000 to produce A and then
is contacted by a patent holder who owns a patent on the finished
32 See text accompanying note 13.
33 This upfront investment would typically involve the purchase of specialized machinery,
or even the hiring of particular employees skilled in the relevant tasks.
2011] 197
The University of Chicago Law Review
product of which A is a component. It is worth $2,500 to S1 to be al-
lowed to continue producing A, and thus the patent holder may be able
to extract up to that amount to license the patent.' This represents a
significant fraction of the total profits ($3,000) that Si stood to realize
when it made the initial investment in producing A.
Contrast this with the bargaining power available to the patent
holder if the production of A and B does not involve any upfront
product-specific investments or if Si has not yet made those invest-
ments. In that case, it is worth only $500 to S1 to be able to produce A
rather than B.5 (This is obviously a much smaller percentage of the
value created by Si's production of A or B.) Thus, if Si can locate the
patent holder before it is forced to choose between producing goods
A and B, it can lower its potential liability substantially.'
S1 will accordingly be willing to invest in searching for patents (on
the finished products of which A and B would form components) be-
fore agreeing to produce either of the two. But its interest in conducting
this search is far from limitless. Si is only willing to search for holders of
patents that might involve A and B up to the difference in value be-
tween finding those patents ahead of time and failing to find them-
here, somewhere between $0 and $2,000." And S1 must discount the
value of conducting the search by the chances that patent holders never
discover that it is producing products that contribute to infringement.
At the same time, however, suppliers who must make product-
specific investments are precisely the firms that patent holders will be
34 This value is based on the alternatives available to Sl. S1 could switch to producing B,
but this would require another investment of $2,000 and would yield net profits of $2,500
($900 x 5 - $2,000). If S1 were allowed to continue producing A, it could earn $5,000; the $2,000
it has invested in new machinery is a sunk cost. The net value to S1 of being able to continue
producing A is thus $5,000 - $2,500 = $2,500.
35 S1 stands to earn $5,000 over five years from producing A and $4,500 over the same
time period from producing B. Because S1 has not yet made an A-specific upfront investment,
the patent holder cannot extract the value of that investment from SI in licensing negotiations.
36 This analysis assumes that there are no uses for A that would not be covered by the
patent. If there were, S1 would be doubly protected against holdup by the patent's owner. If S1
can sell good A to another producer whose end product will not violate a patent, then Sl can
simply transfer its sales when confronted by the patent holder and need not negotiate a license.
In addition, if this were the case, A might qualify as "a staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use" and thus not be subject to suit for contributory in-
fringement. 35 USC § 271(c).
37 The difference between locating the patent holder before S1 makes an initial product-
specific investment and locating the patent holder only afterward is $2,500 - $500 = $2,000. Of
course, it is unlikely that the patent holder would be able to extract the entire surplus in licens-
ing fees. More likely, it will settle for some amount up to a maximum of $2,000. See Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J Legal Stud
399,417-29 (1973) (describing the manner in which parties to a civil lawsuit will opt to divide the
surplus from settlement); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J L &
Econ 61,101-06 (1971) (same).
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most interested in locating. The reason is the same: patent holders will
be able to extract the greatest licensing fees from these firms precisely
because they have already made product-specific investments that they
are at risk of losing. The more difficult question is whether patent hold-
ers will be able to determine ex ante whether suppliers will be forced to
make product-specific investments-or whether their patents are the
type that give rise to product-specific investments more generally.
Answering this question requires extremely detailed knowledge of
the technology and markets involved. For instance, suppose an inventor
holds a patent on a type of integrated circuit. The inventor may know
that a supplier must install a large, expensive silicon etching machine in
order to produce that type of integrated circuit.38 But it is a step further
for the inventor to know whether a supplier can make use of these ma-
chines only in the production of one type of integrated circuit or wheth-
er they can be readily adapted to a variety of different components.
All else being equal, capital-intensive technologies will likely re-
quire greater production-specific investments. Inventors holding patents
over those types of technologies will invest greater resources in
search. For the most part, though, patent holders will likely be igno-
rant regarding the vulnerability of potential litigation targets. Suppli-
ers themselves will possess better information regarding their own
need for production-specific investments, and so they are more likely
to adjust their expenditures on search accordingly. The result is a new
mixed-strategy equilibrium. Patent holders will maintain a baseline
level of investment in search, with holders of patents in capital-
intensive industries expending slightly greater resources. Suppliers
who must make product-specific investments will engage in relatively
high levels of search; suppliers who need not make any product-
specific investments will not search at all.
These strategies also create a potential mismatch between the in-
centives faced by (insolvent) producers and suppliers. As noted above,
when a producer is unavailable for suit and a supplier need not make
any product-specific investments, neither party has any interest in locat-
ing an infringed patent. Neither has anything to lose from being held
liable, and they can safely engage in production and sales unless (or
until) a patent holder locates them. If the supplier must make product-
specific investments, however, it may have a great deal to lose in the
event that the patent holder is able to locate it (or the producer).
38 See, for example, Applied Materials, Applied Materials Fact Sheet (Aug 2010), online at
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/Extemal.Fileitem=UGFyZW50SUQ9MjYyMTM1M3xDaGlsZElEP
TOwNTEzOHxUeXBIPTI=&t=1 (visited Oct 25, 2010) ("Founded in 1967, Applied Materials
creates and commercializes the nanomanufacturing technology that helps produce virtually
every semiconductor chip and flat panel display in the world.").
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Under these circumstances, Si runs an economic risk if it begins
manufacturing a component for P without first ensuring that no rele-
vant patent exists. In light of this risk, Si could take one of two ac-
tions: (1) it could engage in a search for relevant patents at some cost,
and presumably pass that cost along to P in the form of a higher price
for the components it supplies; or (2) it could simply price those com-
ponents at a premium to reflect the litigation risk involved." For its
part, however, P will prefer that S1 remain ignorant of any potential
patents. If S1 does not believe there is any liability risk, then it will sell
to P at a lower price. This issue is further complicated by the fact that
the patents, if they exist, will be patents on P's product, not Si's com-
ponent. P might thus be better positioned to determine what risk S1
might face. But S1 cannot rely on P to indemnify it-P is insolvent.
Nor can S1 fully rely on P to search for relevant patents, given that P
has every incentive to deceive S1 in order to secure a lower price.
Consequently, S1 will be forced to engage in some amount of search-
ing for patents covering the products manufactured by its business
partners, an activity for which it may be ill suited. Again, the search
responsibilities will not necessarily wind up in the hands of the most
efficient party.
The fact that contributory infringers cannot be held liable for pat-
ent infringement absent knowledge of the patent distorts the incen-
tives for search facing both infringers and patent holders. Suppliers
who must make significant product-specific investments will engage in
some amount of search; suppliers who need not will reduce their
search activities effectively to zero. Patent holders and suppliers will
thus both engage in mixed strategies, searching in some cases but not
in others. The result will be inefficiently high levels of search on the
part of patent holders (and in some cases suppliers) as they attempt to
compensate for the protection provided by the knowledge require-
ment and the risk created by product-specific investments.
39 Whether S1 chooses to engage in search will depend on whether search is efficient-
whether Si will be able to save itself money by attempting to find existing patents, which would allow
it to lower the price on the components it manufactures for P. See note 37 and accompanying text.
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II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND DOCTRINAL ALTERNATIVES
A. Discovered and Undiscovered Patents
The previous Part established that patent law's liability rules al-
locate search costs in inefficient and possibly pernicious ways. The
question that remains is the extent to which these misallocations of
search costs lead to greater social harms, perhaps because of reduced
incentives to innovate. In order to gain some purchase on this ques-
tion, it is useful to consider the circumstances under which a patent
holder might come to possess a patent that covers another party's
commercial product. These circumstances can be usefully divided into
two major categories.
1. Contemporaneous independent invention.
The first involves those situations in which the patent holder and
the producer have independently and contemporaneously invented
the same technology-or at least technology similar enough that the
patent reads on the commercial product. Here, search costs are high
on both sides: neither party is aware of the existence of the other. As
the above Part explains, the problems created by this arrangement are
twofold. The first issue is that patent holders will expend excessive
resources in less efficient search. This problem is unavoidable.
The second issue is that patent holders may not succeed in locat-
ing producers at all, leading to reduced returns on their innovation. In
some sense, then, the patent holder will remain undercompensated for
its research efforts.' Yet it is not clear that this presents a problem
from the perspective of social welfare. Here, a commercial firm has
independently developed the patented technology without the incen-
tive of a property right. As a matter of dynamic efficiency, the exist-
ence of the patent was unnecessary to the technological advance-
ment." From the perspective of patents as rewards or incentives for
40 It is almost a shibboleth among patent-related articles to recite that there is no way of
knowing whether the patent law currently sets incentives to innovate at socially optimal levels.
See, for example, Julie E. Cohen and Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Soft-
ware Industry, 89 Cal L Rev 1, 5 n 5 (2001) ("The extent to which the patent system is actually
necessary to induce innovation that would not otherwise occur is an unanswered, and perhaps
unanswerable, empirical question."). The point here is merely that the patent holder will receive
less compensation than it would normally be entitled to, given the contours of its patent and the
commercial value of the invention. What to make of this fact as a normative matter is the subject
of the analysis that follows.
41 See Keith N. Hylton and Sungjoon Cho, The Economics of Injunctive and Reverse Set-
tlements, 12 Am L & Econ Rev 181, 198 (2010) ("[lIt is believed that there is a dynamic efficien-
cy cost associated with patent infringement. If patents are infringed easily with no punishment to
infringers, innovators will have weak incentives to invent new products and processes.").
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innovation, then, the case for investing resources in ensuring that the
patent holder is fully compensated is weak." This is in addition to the
obvious fact that the public will receive the benefit of competition if
other firms are able to enter the market, minimizing the deadweight
loss created by monopoly pricing.
At the same time, this means that the patent holder and the pro-
ducer have likely wasted resources in simultaneous development of
the invention. It might be better, from the perspective of social wel-
fare, if the producer had simply expended resources in locating the
patent holder and licensing the invention, rather than undertaking the
research and development necessary to create it on its own. If this is
the case, then it is necessary that producers be forced to compensate
patent holders, in order that they have the proper incentives to search
rather than innovate.
This idea is based on the prospect" and rent dissipation" theories
of patents. Those theories posit that early patent grantees will have
proper incentives to develop follow-on innovations, organizing a
technological field to achieve the greatest possible invention with the
lowest available duplicative effort.' These theories have been called
into significant question, however, with critics arguing that interfirm
competition is the best driver of rapid innovation" and disputing that
patents could ever eliminate rent dissipation." The soundness of these
various theories of patent economics is still hotly contested. Suffice it
to say that there are theoretical conditions under which the failure to
compensate a patent holder under conditions of contemporaneous
invention could lead to inefficiency and social loss, but the empirical
validity of those conditions remains questionable.
42 See Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 Ohio St L J 1415,
1419 n 13 (1995) ("The most traditional economic theory relating to patent law is the 'reward
theory,' which holds that there will be little or no innovative activity in the absence of patent
protection because ideas are easily appropriated once they are made available to the public.").
43 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J L & Econ
265, 265-71 (1977).
44 See Mark F. Grady and Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 Va L Rev
305, 316-22 (1992) (developing "the idea that the benefit to society of an invention is dissipated
when there are redundant development efforts").
45 See Kitch, 20 J L & Econ at 278 (cited in note 43).
46 See Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 Colum L Rev 839, 843-44 (1990).
47 See Donald G. McFetridge and Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects, and Economic
Surplus: A Comment, 23 J L & Econ 197, 202 (1980) (presenting an economic model suggesting
that efficiency gains realized from the granting of a patent are "dissipated in the rivalry for the
patent itself").
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2. Theft and copying.
The same cannot be said for the second category of situations:
those in which the producer actually knows of the existence of the
patent.' The patent holder may have actually contacted the producer
and offered to license the patent; or the producer may have found the
patent on the market and decided simply to copy the technology rath-
er than license it. In either event, the case for enforcement of the pat-
ent laws is at its apex: an inventor has created a useful invention that
another firm decided to commercialize, and it is important that inven-
tors in this position be able to extract value from their inventions in
order to maintain the incentives to continue innovating.'
If the patent holder has reached out to the producer, search costs
should be negligible on both sides. The two parties have already located
one another. But if the producer has effectively misappropriated the
patent holder's invention without the patent holder realizing it, then
the patent holder may face substantial search costs in attempting to
locate the producer (much less the supplier). Recall that even though
the producer is willfully infringing, it has little incentive to license the
patent from the inventor,' and neither P nor Si has any incentive for
P to inform S1 of the existence of the patent (unless S1 must make
significant product-specific investments).5'
Accordingly, there will be some cases in which the knowledge el-
ement of contributory infringement- and its shift of search costs to
patent holders-will lead to undercompensation of patent holders
who almost certainly deserve remuneration." At minimum, the threat
of nonpaying commercial firms will drive patent holders with genuine-
ly valuable patent rights toward greater levels of search. And there is
little doubt that these searches will be socially wasteful, compared
with the alternative: the producer knows of the patent holder and
could contact it at negligible cost, but instead the patent holder must
expend needless resources searching for the producer.
48 Again, the producer must be insolvent and the suppliers must themselves be unaware of
the patent for any real issue to arise. If the producer is solvent, it is directly infringing; if the
suppliers know of the patent, they are liable for contributory infringement as of the moment
they take action. In either case, the situation reduces to the easiest case, in which both parties
have strong interests in locating one another.
49 See Hylton and Cho, 12 Am L & Econ Rev at 198 (cited in note 41); Katherine J. Strand-
burg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U Colo L Rev 467, 471 (2008) ("In
the standard analysis, incentives for inventing, disclosing, and disseminating new technologies arise
from the potential for recouping innovative investments through commercial sales.").
S0 See Part II.B.
51 See Part II.C.2.
52 On this normative point, see note 40.
2011] 203
The University of Chicago Law Review
B. A Negligence Standard
The doctrine of contributory infringement mediates a great num-
ber of patent-related interactions, and thus one should proceed with
caution before significantly tampering with it. Nonetheless, the ineffi-
cient and socially wasteful ways in which it allocates search make con-
templation of an alternative worthwhile. Consider, then, an alternative
doctrine of contributory infringement that replaces the knowledge re-
quirement with a negligence standard: a firm is liable for contributory
infringement if it knew or reasonably should have known that it man-
ufactured a component of a patented device."
This minor doctrinal change would have a significant impact on
the behavior of suppliers, producers, and patent holders. Suppliers
who might be contributory infringers would no longer be able to
shield themselves from liability by remaining ignorant of potential
patent liability.' Suppliers who do business with insolvent producers
would have to fear bearing the full cost of a suit for infringement, and
thus would have incentives to search for patents covering not just
their own products but the products of the producers with whom they
have contracted. In light of these increased incentives for suppliers to
engage in search, patent holders would be able to reduce their own
expenditures on search accordingly. Because search by patent holders
is likely less efficient than search by commercial firms, this would like-
ly reduce the amount of social waste generated as producers and con-
sumers of intellectual property attempt to locate one another.
In addition, suppliers would be unable to escape liability for in-
fringing activities that took place when they were ignorant of the pat-
ent. Patent holders would accordingly recoup a greater percentage of
the rents generated by their intellectual property. This is not unequiv-
ocally a positive development; it would likely mean higher prices for
consumers and concomitant deadweight losses." But as the previous
Part demonstrates, there are at least a variety of situations in which
there will be negative welfare effects if contributory infringers are
able to escape liability.
53 Consider MPC § 2.02(2)(d) ("A person acts negligently ... when he should be aware of
a substantial ... risk.").
54 It is worth noting that this would not immediately impose liability on every supplier that
furnishes part of an infringing device. In addition to the mens rea requirement, it would be nec-
essary that the part "be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such
patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use." 35 USC § 271(c) (defining a contributory infringer).
s5 See Amelia Smith Rinehart, Contracting Patents: A Modern Patent Exhaustion Doctrine,
23 Harv J L & Tech 483, 486-87 (2010) ("Strong property rights, in the form of draconian patent
enforcement or broad patent grants, may increase the deadweight loss to society resulting from
the grant of exclusive rights.").
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Moreover, in some cases producers and suppliers in contractual
privity could then allocate the costs of search up and down the supply
chain to the most efficient searcher. This allocation would be possible
even if the producer-the likely direct infringer-were insolvent. For
instance, consider the hypothetical supply chain from the previous
Part: a producer (P) that manufactures circuit boards, a supplier (Si)
that produces computer chips, and a second supplier (S2) that devel-
ops logic gates for the chips. Suppose that S2 is the only solvent party.
If the producer's circuit boards infringe a patent, S2 may be held lia-
ble regardless of whether it knows of the existence of the patent. But
S2 may have little information about circuit board manufacturers or
the state of patent rights. Accordingly, it might contract for P to en-
gage in a search for applicable patents, adjusting the price of the com-
ponents it provides to P accordingly. Of course, this is subject to the
caveat noted in the previous Part: P may not wish to find relevant pat-
ents, because they will raise the price charged by S2, and so S2 may
not be able to rely fully on P's work.
Parties will also be able to allocate the costs of liability up and
down the supply chain. For instance, when P is solvent, S1 could arrange
for P to indemnify it against all liability for infringement, or just
against liability arising from P's products (rather than Si's). The party
who bears the risk will in many cases be the same party who can most
efficiently search for existing patents. Matters become slightly more
complex when one or more parties are insolvent. If P is insolvent or
unreachable by suit, then Si will effectively be indemnifying P against
liability for infringement, a fact that will alter the contract price at
which Si sells to P. This last fact may complicate negotiations be-
tween P and Si. If S1 is subject to liability for contributory infringe-
ment without knowledge of a patent, then it may need to scrutinize
P's finances to determine whether P can satisfy a damages verdict or
whether Si will be stuck with the entirety of the liability.' Thus, elim-
inating the stringent mens rea requirement associated with contribu-
tory infringement may in some cases increase contracting costs
among parties within a supply chain. At the same time, however, it
56 A similar problem arises through the doctrine of joint and several liability. When multi-
ple tortfeasors are each partially responsible for some harm, any single one of those tortfeasors
can be held liable for the full amount of damages. See, for example, American Motorcycle Asso-
ciation v Superior Court, 578 P2d 899, 901 (Cal 1978) (preserving the doctrine of joint and sever-
al liability even under a regime of comparative negligence). That single tortfeasor can force the
others to indemnify it to the extent that they are responsible, id at 901-02, but this right of par-
tial indemnification is worthless if one or more of the other tortfeasors is judgment proof. This
creates an incentive for potential tortfeasors to examine the finances of parties with whom they
might be involved in a joint action. For instance, a surgeon would likely want to invest in learn-
ing whether the anesthesiologist working alongside her carries sufficient malpractice insurance.
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will eliminate the ability of firms within that supply chain to extract
rents via contract and force those parties to license patents they might
otherwise have ignored.
Reducing the knowledge requirement for contributory infringe-
ment to merely a negligence standard will of course lead to many more
suits for infringement and greatly heightened vigilance on the part of
commercial firms of all stripes. Accordingly, the preceding analysis
should be understood not as a comprehensive case for switching to a
negligence regime, but as a suggestion that such a move may have
salutary effects on the division of search responsibilities. In addition,
it is worth noting that § 271's safe harbor for "staple article[s] or
commodit[ies] of commerce"' will protect many potential contribu-
tory infringers who would be implicated by a shift from knowledge
to negligence. If it is possible to set liability appropriately via means
other than the mens rea requirement, then adjusting that requirement
to allocate search efficiently becomes all the more attractive.
CONCLUSION
Patent law's infringement doctrines function not only as rules of
liability, but as rules of search as well. Whether commercial firms
must invest resources in searching for existing patents, or whether
patent holders must themselves shoulder the burden of searching for
putative infringers, is determined by the incentives that these parties
face to strike licensing agreements (or enter into litigation) earlier,
rather than later. Under normal circumstances, patent law's liability
rules generate approximately optimal investments in search. But when
a direct infringer is insolvent or unreachable, the fact that contributo-
ry infringers can be held liable only when they have knowledge of the
patent shifts search responsibilities toward patent holders. The result
is inefficient levels of search and corresponding social welfare losses.
57 35 USC § 271(c).
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